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My  topic,  "Meeting  Competition  in Foreign  Markets,"  suggests  a  dis-
cussion of the tools  of foreign competition.  These can include price,  quality,
freight  and  credit  facilities.  All  are  important;  other  things  being  equal,
any  one  can  be  decisive  in  a  particular  trade  situation.  But  they  have
relatively  little impact in the face  of the  primary  force  in  the world  market
today-a  large  and  growing  surplus  supply  that  is  significantly  altering
both  levels  and  patterns  of  trade.  It  is  in  this  larger  framework  that
I  would  like  to  discuss  the  question  of  meeting  competition.
Recent  increases  in  production  have  expanded  food  grain  supplies
well  beyond  current  demand.  Carry-over  stocks  in  the  five  major  wheat
exporting  areas  have  increased  in three  successive  years.  Wheat  supplies
available  for  export  in  these  countries  are  now  estimated  at  a  record
3.8  billion  bushels,  more  than  double  the  expected  level  of  world  trade.
Unlike  the  earlier  period  of  surpluses,  today  the  United  States  holds
only  about  a  third  of  these  stocks.  The  remainder  is  widely  distributed
among  other  major  wheat  exporters,  all  actively  seeking  market  outlets.
At  the  same  time,  several  countries  which  have  traditionally  taken
large  quantities  of  wheat  from  the  United  States  are  increasing  their
domestic  production.  India  and  Pakistan,  for  example,  are  energetically
seeking  self-sufficiency  in  food  grain  production.
As  a  result  of  these  two  trends-increasing  supplies  in  exporting
countries  and  reduced  needs  in  some  primary  importing  regions-world
wheat trade has declined from 62.4 million tons in 1965-66  to an estimated
45  million  tons  in  1968-69.  U.S.  wheat  exports  in  the  marketing  year
just  ended  totaled  only  542  million  bushels-220  million  bushels  less
than  in the prior marketing  year.
The  world  surplus  of  wheat  has  also  spilled  over  into  feed  grain
markets,  especially  in  Western  Europe.  As  a  result,  total  world  exports
of  feed  grain  products  have  leveled  off,  and  the  U.S.  share  of  this  trade
has  actually  declined.
All  of  these  developments  are  symptomatic  of  the  growing  problem
of meeting  competition.  They result from  a combination  of  circumstances.
First,  improvements  in  production  techniques  have  sharply  reduced  the
104costs  of production  throughout  the  world.  At the  same  time  price  incen-
tives  to  wheat  producers  in  several  potentially  productive  areas  have
been  increased  to levels  far  above world  prices.  Finally,  through  different
means  and  for  different  reasons,  much  of  the  new  production  has  been
granted  a  preference  in  traditional  U.S.  markets.
An  effective  competitive  trade  strategy  means  adopting  policies  which
respond  to  the  challenges  posed  by  these  developments  in  three  different
types  of  markets-Communist  countries,  industrialized  nations,  and  the
less  developed  regions  of  the  world.
COMMUNIST  COUNTRIES
Meeting  competition  in  Communist  countries  is  mainly  a  matter
of deciding  to become  a competitor.  We  are  excluded  from these  markets
by  U.S.  laws  and  regulations  that  range  from  outright  embargo  of  ship-
ments  to  Albania,  Mainland  China,  North  Korea,  Cuba,  and  North
Vietnam  to  prohibitive  cargo  preference  and  part-cargo  requirements
in  sales  to  other  Communist  countries.
It is  surely  understandable  that the  United  States  may  wish  to  restrict
sales  of  strategic  goods  to  certain  countries  for  reasons  of  foreign  policy
and national  interest.  The decision  to restrict grain  sales to these  countries
is not  as  easily  understood.  We  can  impose  little  hardship  on  Communist
countries  by  refusing  to  sell  them  grain.  France,  Canada,  and  Australia
have  shown  themselves  quite  willing  to  meet  Communist  needs.  On  the
other  hand,  by  these  restraints  we  deny  ourselves  a  great  deal.  They
reduce  our  export  volume,  reduce  farm  income,  reduce  resource  employ-
ment  in  export-related  trades,  cost  the  United  States  valuable  foreign
exchange,  and  offer  no  particular  advantage  to  maritime  unions,  who
support  the  restrictions  most  enthusiastically.
As  I  emphasized  earlier,  these  economic  considerations  should  not
overrule  broader  national  policy  interests.  It  seems  reasonable,  however,
to  ask  whether  the  economic  advantages  of  East-West  trade  have  been
weighed  as fully  as they might be  in  these  policy decisions.
INDUSTRIALIZED  NATIONS
The  problems  of  meeting  competition  in  the  markets  of  developed
countries  are  more  complex  and  their  importance  for  American  agricul-
ture  infinitely  greater.  Our  exports  to  the  two  most  important  of  these
markets-the European  Economic  Community  and Japan-are challenged
by  fundamentally  different  circumstances.
Our  problems  with  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  have
emerged  with  her  implementation  of  a  common  grains  policy,  which
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(1)  a  unified  system  of  incentives  to  producers  at  levels  nearly  double
current  world  prices;  (2)  a  common  external  tariff  adjusted  from  day
to day  to provide  an  absolute  margin of preference  for  internal  producers;
and  (3)  a  system  for  subsidizing  exports  of  surplus  production,  financed
in  part from proceeds  of  levies  on  imports.
These  policies  have  sharply  reduced  exports  to  the  EEC.  Internal
wheat  production  has  risen  much  more  rapidly  than  anyone  anticipated
and reduced  import requirements  from  all  external  suppliers.  The burden
of  increases  in  internal  feed  grain production  and  widespread  substitution
of wheat  and lower quality feedstuffs  for corn  and grain sorghum  in  animal
feeds  has  fallen  mainly  on  the  United  States.  Our  feed  grain  exports  to
the  EEC  declined  a  third  in  fiscal  year  1969.
These changes  have not been  achieved without  cost.  The rapid buildup
in European  agricultural  production  will  cost the  EEC  an  estimated  $2.5
billion for market intervention,  storage  and handling,  denaturing  subsidies,
and  export  restitutions  this  year.  On  the  other  hand,  the  revenues  from
variable  levies  on imports,  which were  expected to finance  these  expenses,
have  declined  as  the  EEC  approaches  self-sufficiency.
These  costs  represent  only  about  half  of  total  farm  expenditures.
The  rest,  for  such  things  as  land  improvement,  farm  consolidation,  and
research,  are  borne  almost  entirely  by  individual  member  countries.
When  consumer  costs,  measured  in  higher  food  prices,  are  added,  the
total  cost  of  agricultural  support  within  the  EEC  is  estimated  at  $14.5
billion  annually.
These  rising  costs  are  bringing  demands  for  change  in  the  EEC's
agricultural  policies.  Most  recent  proposals-such  as  still  higher  corn
and  barley  prices,  larger  denaturing  subsidies,  and  consumption  taxes
on  soybean  oil  and  meal-would  further  restrict  competition  of  U.S.
farm  products  with  those  of  European  and  associated  origins.
Beyond  these  immediate  proposals  lies  the  "Mansholt  Plan,"  calling
for  a  broad  restructuring  of  European  agriculture.  Mansholt  proposes
a  set  of  measures  designed  to  increase  farm  size  and  efficiency.  A  direct
consequence  of  these  measures,  Mansholt  observes,  is  that  this  farm
structure  "with  [its]  greater  openness  to  technological  progress,  is  bound
to  speed  up  the  expansion  of  agricultural  output."  While  the  eventual
goal  of  this  plan  is  nowhere  openly  stated,  it  seems  clear  that  Mansholt
has  proposed  a  production  model  capable  of  supplying  the  EEC's  needs
and  the export  market  at very  competitive  prices.
The  timing of  our response  to  the challenge  posed by  the  EEC's  new
policy seems  especially  critical.  Most of the EEC's increased  grain  produc-
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including  those  for  improved  seed,  fertilizer,  and  other  chemicals.  Much
of  this  investment  would  be  discouraged  by  the  prospect  of  significantly
lower  prices.
But if the  EEC  implements  Mansholt's  program  of  structural  reforms,
present  high  prices  are  likely  to  be  capitalized  into  fixed  costs  for  land,
land  improvement,  machinery,  storage  and  transportation  facilities,  all
likely  to  remain  in production  at  much  lower  price  levels.  If  this  occurs,
the  EEC  will  no  longer  be  a  significant  market  for  U.S.  producers  but
instead  will  become  an  active  competitor  in  world  grain  trade.
Japan,  too,  must  decide  who  will  supply  her  basic  foodstuffs,  but
for her  the  goal  of  self-sufficiency  is  probably  unattainable.  Nevertheless,
the decisions  which  lie ahead for the  Japanese  government  could  radically
alter  the  potential  of  this  market for  future  U.S.  exports.
Joseph  Barse  has  analyzed  the  policy  foundations  and  implications
of  alternative  food  strategies  for  Japan.1 He  suggests  that  the  Japanese
government's  choices  will  be  governed  by  a  number  of  considerations-
the  position  Japan  desires  in  Southeast  Asia,  the  degree  to  which  she
will  be  willing  to  depend  on  imports  of  essential  foods,  the  mix  of  this
dependency,  the  reliability  and  prices  offered  by  different  suppliers,  and
the  markets  made  available  for  her  exports.
To illustrate  the  implications  of Japan's  choices  for  U.S.  farm exports,
Barse  suggests  three  alternative  models-a  Western  strategy  heavily
oriented to the United States  as a source of food, a Pacific  strategy oriented
to  Southeast  Asia  as  a  food  supplier,  and  an  Eastern  strategy  which
would  rely  mainly  on  domestic  food  production.  Barse  estimates  that  by
1985  Japan  would  import only  18.8  million metric  tons under  an Eastern
strategy.  Under  a  Western  strategy,  however,  she  would  import  50.2
million metric tons.  This  adds  up to a difference  in potential  grain imports
of  32  million metric  tons  or three times  the  level  of  her  present  imports.
Japan  will  base  her  decisions  on  a  number  of  considerations,  only
some  of which  can we  influence  even  indirectly.  The  United  States,  how-
ever,  will have two  significant levers-the  terms  on  which  we  are  willing
to  buy  Japanese  exports  and  the  terms  on  which  we  are  willing  to  offer
Japan  grain.
Unfortunately,  recent  U.S.  actions  with  respect  to  both  exports  and
imports  have  done  little  to  create  the  sort  of  confidence  a  Western  food
strategy  decision  implies:
1Joseph  R.  Barse,  "Japan's  Food  Demand  and  1985  Grain  Import  Prospects,"
Foreign  Agricultural  Economic  Report  No.  53,  Economic  Research  Service,  USDA,
June  1969,  p.  71.
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subsequent  efforts  to  sustain  world  wheat  prices  well  above  long-term
equilibrium  levels  have  created  apprehension  and  resentment  in  Japan.
This  dissatisfaction  has  not  been  wholly  quelled  by  our  more  recent
insistence  that  U.S.  wheat  be  competitively  priced  in  the  Far  East,  if
necessary  at levels  well  below  IGA  minimums.
Second,  our  failure  to  deal  effectively  with  interferences  in  the  flow
of  grain  resulting  from  prolonged  strikes  in  the  maritime  industry  has
made  Japan  hesitant  to increase  her  dependence  on the United  States  for
her  essential  food  requirements.
Moreover,  efforts  by  the  new  administration  to  exact  from  Japan  a
"voluntary"  agreement  to  limit  textile  shipments  to  the  United  States
have  renewed  doubts  about  our  commitment  to  the  principles  of  the
General  Agreement  on  Tariff  and Trade  (GATT)  where  imports  impinge
on  basic  industries.
Finally, with respect  to both  Japan  and  Western  Europe,  if  the United
States  is  to  meet  competition,  sooner  or  later  we  must  face  up  to  the
problems  inherent  in  our  domestic  farm  policy.  The  United  States  cannot
expect  other  developed  countries  to  reduce  price  incentives  and  import
restrictions  unless  we  are  willing  to  lead  the  way  with  domestic  policies
that  assure  consistent,  market-oriented  pricing  of  our  farm  exports.
While  lower  U.S.  export  prices  would  not  in  themselves  deter  produc-
tion  in  the  EEC,  they  would  amplify  and  focus  attention  on  aspects  of
the  common  grains  policy  which  seem  most  vulnerable-their  social  and
governmental  costs.  Also,  they  would  tend  to  discourage  capital  invest-
ments  in  other  developed  countries  where  government  policies  are  now
aimed  at  increasing  less  efficient  domestic  production  for  import  substitu-
tion  and  commercial  export.
On  balance,  it  would  seem, this  country  has  much  to  gain  by  taking
the initiative  in  rationalizing  farm  polices  on  a worldwide  scale.
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Effective  demand  in  developing  countries  is  still  largely  dormant.
As it emerges,  however,  traditional  patterns  of competition  among  export-
ing  countries  are  likely  to  develop.
The  most  problematical  aspect  of  this  market  involves  the  extent  of
future  import requirements.  Several  developing  countries  are  gearing  their
production to meet domestic needs  and, in some cases, to produce  surpluses
for  export.  In  both  India  and  Pakistan  programs  of  self-sufficiency  in
food  grains  have  been  incorporated  into  overall  strategies  for  economic
development.
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and  technical components  of what has  been called  the "green  revolution."
By  1970-71,  India  plans to increase  total grain  area by 5  million hectares,
gross  irrigated  grain  area  by  18  million  hectares,  areas  planted  to  high-
yielding  varieties  by  13.2  million  hectares,  and  fertilizer  used  for  grain
by  3 million tons,  all  over levels  employed  in grain production  in  1959-60
to  1961-62.  With  these  investments  India  hopes  to  achieve  a  1970-71
target  of  120  million  metric  tons  of  food  grains,  an  increase  of  nearly
50 percent  over  a  five-year  moving  average  output for  1962-63.
In  order  to  achieve  this  goal,  the  Indian  government  is  committing
large  portions  of  her  limited  capital  and  foreign  exchange,  as  well  as
large  amounts  of  borrowed  funds  to  capital-  and  skills-intensive  farm
technology.
In  making  these  commitments,  the  Indian  government  has  been
strongly  encouraged  by  several  international  agencies  and  lending  organi-
zations  as  well  as  by  new  "self-help"  provisions  of  Public  Law  480.
These  latter  provisions  are  especially  important.  They  require  food  aid
recipients  to demonstrate  that their  resources  are  being  committed:  (1) to
expanding  food  acreage,  increasing  investment  in  technical  and  capital-
intensive  agricultural  supporting  industries  and  in  modem technical  farm
education  and  research,  (2)  to  developing  marketing,  storage,  and  trans-
portation  facilities,  and  (3)  to  the  creation  of  market  incentives  through
input  subsidies  and  price  supports.
Clearly,  the  priority  in  this  strategy  is  to  increase  the  aggregate  level
of food  grains  production,  following  a  pattern  familiar  to  Western  experi-
ence.  But  there  are  two  sorts  of  questions  concerning  this  strategy  that
have  not  been  widely  discussed.  First,  where  would  a  successful  imple-
mentation  of  the  new  production  technology  lead  India?  Second,  is
India's  agricultural  problem  simply  one  of  aggregate  supply?
The  issues  surrounding  the  first  of  these  questions-what  would
success  mean-seem  fairly clear.  Success  is  likely to occur  in  areas  where
operational  and  technical  components  can  be  most  quickly  implemented
and where  market  incentives  and  a marketing  structure  are  at  least  mini-
mally present.  In  other  words,  a  successful  implementation  of  the "green
revolution"  is  likely  to  proceed  most  rapidly  in  the  areas where  the  best
farmers,  the most  reliable water  supplies, the most "marketized"  economy,
and  the  most  developed  infrastructure  are  present.  Indeed,  these  areas
could  quickly  become  surplus  producing  areas.
With  present  marketing  patterns  oriented  toward  the  large  cities
and  the  coast,  rather  than  the  rural  hinterlands,  this  very  success  could
prove  a  frustration  and  an  economic  burden.  India's  farm  sector  could
109become  spotted  with  localized  surpluses  and  localized  deficits,  amplifying
present  inequities  in  wealth  and  welfare.  At  the  same  time,  India  would
be  burdened  with  exportable  surpluses  in  a  market  already  depressed
by  present  and  growing  carry-over  stocks.
The second  question-what are  India's  agricultural  development  needs
-raises  issues  even  more  problematical.  India  must  do  more  than  raise
the  level  of  her  production.  She  must  seek  to  balance  increased  supplies
with  increased  demand  and-often  outside  the  framework  of  money
markets-must  link  available  supplies  with  real  need.  In  other  words,
India's  agricultural problem  is  also  one  of  distribution,  both of production
and  of benefits.
A  glance  at  India's  transportation  network  suggests  the  problem  in
distributing  production  gains.  Only  11  percent  of  India's  580,000  villages
have  reasonably  adequate  access  roads.  One  village  in  three  is  more
than five  miles  from  a  satisfactory  road.  It has  been  estimated  that  India
needs  a  million  miles  of  new  roads  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  small  villages.
Moreover,  rural markets  capable of supplying inputs-fertilizers,  seeds,
insecticides,  and  small  machinery-and  of  marketing  the  output  must be
created  in  areas  currently  lying  outside  the  money  economy.  As  Gunnar
Myrdal  has  pointed  out,  much  of  this  isolation  from  market  incentives
is  not  simply  the  result  of  limited  capital  resources.2 The  village  social
structure  and  its  tenure  policies  concentrate  wealth,  land,  and  power  in
the  hands  of  a  feudalistic  and  religious  minority  at  the  top  of  the  social
pyramid.  They  are  impediments  to  the  diffusion  of  market  incentives  of
an  institutional  and attitudinal  nature.  During  the  long transitional  period
required  to  break  down  these  ingrained  impediments,  many  rural  areas
will  depend  almost  exclusively  on  local  production  for  their  food  needs.
These  structural  impediments  are  responsible  for  another  of  India's
developmental  problems,  her  low  productivity  and  vast  underutilization
of labor.  Again,  as  Myrdal  has  pointed  out,  these  labor problems  cannot
be  resolved  by  strictly  economic  means.  Religious  and  social  attitudes
have  excluded  many from  the laboring  population  who  could  and  should
be  working.  Tenure  policies  and  village  institutions  also  have  limited  the
days  and hours  worked.
In  other  words,  many  bottlenecks  in  India's  agriculture  are  ingrained
in  attitudes  and  institutions,  in  a  developmental  history,  which  has  been
in the  past  and  will  be  in  the  medium-term  future,  remote  from  techno-
logical changes.  To  cast her  agricultural  problem  simply  as one  of  raising
aggregate  production  is  to  overlook  problems  which,  from  India's  point
2Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, An  Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 3  Vols.,
Random  House,  New York,  1968, p.  1053  ff.
110of  view,  are  more  urgent.  While  India  cannot  afford  to  ignore  her  food
supply  problems,  neither  can  she  afford  to  ignore  her  food  distribution
problems,  nor  the  larger  question  of  the  diffusion  of  the  benefits  of
economic  development.
The exclusive  preoccupation  of many  well-meaning  international  agen-
cies  and  of  P.L.  480  "self-help"  provisions  with  questions  of  technology
and  production  increases  may  be  an  unfortunate  and  dangerous  strategy
for  reasons  far  more fundamental  and  important  than  their  effect  on  our
ability  to  meet  competition  in  these  markets,  though  this  too  is  involved.
CONCLUSION
In  each  of  these  market  areas-Communist  countries,  industrialized
nations,  and  the  developing  regions  of  the  world-meeting  competition
means  more  than  merely  performing  well  in  the  market  place.  Meeting
competition  means  identifying  problems  and  their  supporting  policies,
formulating constructive  responses,  which  reflect not just our  own interests
but the interests  of all the parties involved,  and implementing  these policies
on  a  broad  scale.
The record  suggests  we  have not met  this challenge  effectively.  Unless
a conscious  decision  is made  to give  farm exports  a  higher priority  in  the
order  of  U.S.  objectives,  the  prospects  for  success  in  meeting  foreign
competition  are  not  very  promising.
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The Changing Structure of
American Society